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In the Supreme Court
of the State of U tab

EPHRAIM THEATRE COMPANY,
a Corporation,
Plaintiff~

vs.
HAL F. HAWK, THE HEIRS OF
CLAUDE HAWK, and CLAUDE
HAWK THEATRE CORPORATION,
Defendants.

Case
No. 8606

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

This is an appeal from a judgment of the District Court
of Sanpete County in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendants, Hal F. Hawk and the Claude Hawk Theatre Corporation, requiring the payment of rent under a written contract.
The action was filed on the theory that the contract and
lease, Exhibit 1, set out in full below, imposed upon the
defendants a firm obligation to pay as rental the sum of $125.00
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per month for the use of the Ephraim Theatre building, also
referred to in the pleadings and records as the Towne Theatre
building. The prayer was for a judgment for rent in the amount
of $1250.00 and for an accounting of expenditures under the
contract. The defendants answered alleging that the contract
provided for the operation of the theatre business as a joint
venture; that out of the monthly proceeds from such operation
the expenses were to be paid first; that the monthly rent was
2 second Charge on such proceeds, and that any residue after
paying such monthly expenses and rent was to be divided
equally between the two parties. It was further alleged that
since May, 1955 the proceeds of the operation had not been
sufficient to pay expenses and that there had been no money
on hand to pay the rent.

CONTRACT AND LEASE
This contract and lease made and entered into this
30th day of April, 1946, by and between the EPHRAIM
THEATRE CORPORATION, a Utah Corporation, as
party of the first part, and CLAUDE HAWK and HAL
F. HAWK, as parties of the second part, WITNESSETH:
THAT WHEREAS, the party of the first part is the
owner of the Ephraim Theatre building located at
Ep'hraim, Utah, and desires the parties of the second
part to assume the supervision, management and operation thereof including the remodeling of the building
and the installation of new sound equipment and furnishi~g .throughout and the parties of the second part
are wtllmg to take over and to supervise the remodeling
of t~e said building and the refurnishing of the said
furmture and the management of the said theatre busi-i
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ness during the time and upon the terms and conditions
hereinafter stated.
NOW THEREFORE, it is mutually agreed as follows:
1. That the real estate upon which the said Ephraim
Theatre building is now located, specifically described
as follows, to-wit:

90ft. N. SE corner Lot 1 Bl. 20 Plat A Ephraim
City Survey, Th. W 881/2 ft., N 561f2 ft., E 881f2
ft., S 56lf2 ft. to point of beginning.
shall be devoted during the term of this agreement to
the purposes herein specifically stated.
That each of the parties hereto will contribute to a
common fund for the remodeling of the said building
and the refurnishing and equipping of the said theatre
the sum of $3250.00 making a total sum of $6500.00
to be expended for the purposes herein specified.
2. That the parties of the second part will direct and
supervise the remodeling of the said building and the
purchase and installation of sound equipment, operating equipment, furnishings, etc., for the said theatre,
subject, however, to the approval of the party of the
first part, of all such remodeling of the building and
the purchase of such equipment and furnishings.
3. The parties of the second part agree to personally
manage the said theatre business from date hereof to
the 1st day of May, 1957.
4. The parties of the second part shall receive and
hold the proceeds from the conduct of the said business
and dispose of the same as follows, to-wit:
(a) Pay all expenses incurred in connection with
the operation of the said theatre business including
compensation of a local manager, cashier, operator and
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such additional help as the parties of the second part
shall see fit to employ.
(b) Pay to the parties of the first part as rental
for the said Ephraim Theatre building, the sum of
$100.00 monthly until two small front offices in the
said Ephraim Theatre building now rented shall be
taken over by the parties hereto for or in connection
wit'h the remodeling of the said building, and after
the said offices are taken over for such purposes as
herein provided then there shall be paid to the party
of the first part the sum of $125.00 monthly as rental
for the said entire building.
(c) Divide the residue of the monthly income from
the operation of the said theatre building, one-half to
the party of the first part, and one-'half to the parties
of the second part.
5. The parties of the second part shall, at all times,
keep accurate books, records and accounts of all busi·
ness transacted by or for the said theatre, which books,
records and accounts the party of the first part shall
have the right to inspect at any time it may elect
to do so.
6. This lease and agreement shall expire on the 1st
day of May, 1957, at which time all improvements made
to the said Ephraim Theatre building during the life of
this agreement and all furniture, fixtures, sound equipment, operating equipment and other property contained in the said Ephraim Theatre building or acquired
for and/ or used in connection with the operation of
the said building shall become the property of the party
of the first part.
7. This contract and lease shall not be assigned,
transferred or otherwise disposed of by either of the
parties hereto without the written consent of the other
part and any sale or disposition of the said Ephraim

6
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Theatre building by the party of the first part shall,
in all respects, be subject to the terms and conditions
of this agreement, and the parties of the second part
may retain possession of the said building and the
grounds upon which the same is erected for the purpose
of operating the said theatre and carrying out the
terms and conditions of this agreement which, in all
respects, shall be binding upon the administrators, successors and assigns of the parties hereto.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the party of the first
part has caused this instrument to be executed by its
President and Secretary thereunto duly authorized and
the parties of the second part have hereunto set their
hands in triplicate this 30th day of April, 1946.
EPHRAIM THEATRE CORPORATION
a Utah Corporation,
By I sl Alice L. Doke, President
Party of the First Part
Attest:

I sl L. Cannon Anderson
Secretary

lsi Claude Hawk
lsi Hal Hawk
(Duly acknowledged)
Pursuant to the above contract the parties contributed to
a common fund the sum of money required by the contract,
or more, and the parties of the second part supervised fhe
remodeling of the building and the purchase and installation
of equipment and furnishings for the theatre. The parties of
the second part personally managed the theatre, received the
proceeds from conduct of the business and disbursed such
proceeds. The business was profitable enough to pay all
expenses and rent and to leave money for distribution in the
form of "dividends," (the residue referred to in paragraph 4
7
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( c} of the contract), until September 30, 1954 when the last
"dividend" check was sent. (Tr. 38.) As shown by Exhibit 14
the total proceeds disbursed to the plaintiff, after paying
expenses, from 1946 to 1955 was $26,800.00 of which
$12,575.00 was for rent, and the remaining $14,225.00 was
disbursed as dividends, (Tr. 93, 94). From September, 1954
until April, 1955, there was enough proceeds from operation
of the business to pay rent, (Tr. 38). Since April, 1955 the
proceeds have not been sufficient to pay expenses. (See Exhibits
9 and 11.) No money has been available to pay rent. The
business of the theatre decreased greatly in 1955 and 1956
because the theatre was not equipped with cinemascope, and it
was difficult to get quality motion picture films without that
equipment, (Tr. 87, 95). Also, see Exhibit 11.
The evidence is uncontradicted that since 1949 a copy of
each check issued on the Towne Theatre bank account has
been sent to and received by the plaintiff, (Tr. 71). During
the entire period of seven years, Checks have been issued to
cover a part of the expense of maintaining an office in Salt
Lake City in which the business of the Towne Theatre has been
conducted, including such matters as the keeping of all books
and records, the making of the numerous reports to the federal
and state governments, the booking of films, and the keeping
of records to support claims for rebates. (Tr. 80-83.) It is
clear that since 1948 (when Claude Hawk moved his office
from his 'home to downtown Salt Lake) the plaintiff has been
fully informed as to charges for office expense and salary in
Salt Lake City and has for many years accepted checks for
its share of the profit of the joint venture.
8
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There is no evidence in the record that amounts paid for
"expenses incurred in connection with the operation of the
said theatre business" as provided by paragraph 4 (a) of the
contract were excessive. There is much in the record as to
what was actually spent from 1946 to 1955 but not one word
of testimony that such expenditures were not necessary. In
fact the record shows that only a few items amounting to a
very small sum were objected to by the plaintiff over the years,
although since 1949 the plaintiff had admittedly received a
copy of every check issued. Objection was made to an item of
$2 5.00 for assistance on income tax paid in 1948 and to some
items of travel expense about the same year. (Tr. 27-30.)
There is evidence that in 195 3 the rent was not paid for
three months, and Mr. Anderson told Grace Hawk (widow
of Claude Hawk) that "it should be paid and he said that if
it isn't paid within thirty days that our, this lease can be
cancelled." The attorney for Mrs. Hawk was out of town
and she could not see the lease so she assumed that Mr. Anderson knew about the provisions of the lease and she borrowed
$375.00 and paid the rent. Later it was taken out of the proceeds of the theatre business and paid back. ( T r. 74-7 5.)
The trial court found that the contract, Exhibit 1, had
been made, that the rent had been paid until May 1, 1955, that
the contract provided for payment of $125.00 per month
"minimum rental," that such rental was less t'han that spent
by the plaintiff for taxes, depreciation, repairs and payment
of interest on borrowed capital; that the parties by their conduct have put their own construction on the contract (referring
to the payment of three months rent in 195 3) and that the
<)

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

defendants have attempted to avoid payment of rent "by
extracting undue and exorbitant operating expenses from the
proceeds of the operation" of the theatre. Based on these findings the court entered judgment against the appealing defendants for $1250.00, the amount of the rent from May 1, 1955
to February 29, 1956.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
1. The contract imposes no obligation to pay a minimum
rent, but provides only for payment out of the proceeds of the
business.

2. The defendants did not arbitrarily set operating costs

so high as to deprive the plaintiff of rent.
3. The plaintiff is estopped from questioning the expenses
of operating the theatre.

ARGUMENT
1. THE CONTRACT IMPOSES NO OBLIGATION TO
PAY A MINIMUM RENT, BUT PROVIDES ONLY FOR
PAYMENT OUT OF THE PROCEEDS OF THE BUSINESS.

It is clear that when the Ephraim Theatre Corporation
Claude Hawk and Hal F. Hawk entered into the contract
dated April 30, 1946, they intended to engage in a joint venture for the operation of a theatre business. It is recited in
the contract that the corporation owned a theatre building and
desired the Hawks to assume the "supervision, management
•~nd
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and operation thereof including the the remodeling of the
building, and the installation of new sound equipment and
furnishing throughout". Each party agreed in paragraph 1 to
contribute to a common fund "for the remodeling of the said
building and the refurnishing and equipping of the said theatre
the sum of $3250.00 making a total sum of $6500.00 to be
expended for the purposes herein specified". The contract
then sets out in paragraphs 2 and 3, the duties of the Hawks
with respect to the remodeling, equipping and furnishing the
theatre building and to managing the theatre.
Paragraph 4 provides for disposal of the proceeds from
the operation of the business in clear and unequivocal language.
"4. The parties of the second part (Hawks) shall
receive and hold the proceeds from the conduct of the
said business and dispose of the same as follows, to-wit:
(a) Pay all expenses incurred in connection with
the operation of the said theatre business including the
compensation of a local manager, cashier, operator
and such additional help as the parties of the second
part shall see fit to employ.
(b) Pay to the parties of the first part as rental
for the said Ephraim Theatre building, the sum of
$100.00 monthly until two small front offices in the
said Ephraim Theatre building now rented shall be
taken over by the parties hereto for or in connection
with the remodeling of the said building, and after
the said offices are taken over for such purposes as
herein provided then there shall be paid to the party of
the first part the sum of $125.00 monthly as rental
for the said entire building.
(c) Divide the residue of the monthly income from
the operation of the said theatre building, one-half to
11
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the party of the first part, and one-half to the parties of
the second part." (Emphasis added.)
The contract requires in paragraph 5 that the Hawks keep
books and make them available for inspection by the corporation. In paragraph 6 it is provided that all improvements
to the building, and all equipment and furnishings shall become
the property of the Corporation at the expiration of the agreement on May 1, 1957.
During the trial of the case, the plaintiff did not point
out a single ambiguity in the contract. There is no finding
of fact by the trial court indicating that any word or phrase
used in the contract is susceptible of two meanings. It is submitted t'hat none can be found, and that this contract is clear
and all of its terms are so explicit and certain that they are
not open to construction. There is no word which indicates
a firm obligation on the part of the Hawks to pay rent whether
or not there is a profit after paying all other expenses. There
is clearly an intent well expressed that the proceeds from the
business would pay (a) expenses and (b) fixed rental, and
that (c) any residue left after paying (a) and (b) would be
divided one-half to each. The word "residue" is significant.
T'he entire document is entirely consistent with this intent.
The plaintiff, by the terms of the contract, was to contribute
the use of the building and one-half of the $6500.00 required
for remodeling, refurnishing and equipping the building. The
Hawks were to pay half of the expense of remodeling, refurnishing and equipping the building and were to furnish supervision and management. A fund consisting of the proceeds
from the operation of the business was to be created and after
12
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paying the expenses and rent ~he profits were to be divided.
A more typical joint venture arrangement could not be found.
The law is well settled in this jurisdiction and elsewhere
that where the language of a contract is clear and all of its
terms are explicit and certain, it is not open to construction.
Burt v. Stringfellow, 45 Utah 207, 143 P. 234.
The rule is well stated in Page on the Law of Contracts,
Vol. 4, P. 3574, as follows:
"It is only when the contract is ambiguous that evidence of surrounding circumstances can be considered
for the purpose of ascertaining the intention of the
parties. If the meaning of a written contract is clear,
evidence of the surrounding facts is inadmissible to
contradict its terms.''
It is the duty of the court to determine the intention of
the parties and to enforce the contract in accordance with such
intention. The court should not determine by "hindsight"
whether the contract was wise and if not, make a new contract

for the parties.
Hughes v. Pulley, 47 Utah 544, 155 P. 337.
Johnson v. Geddes, 49 Utah 137, 161 P. 910.
The statement of Justice Frick in the case of Johnson v.
Geddes, supra ( 49 Utah, at page 145), is so applicable to
this case that it is quoted.
"At the threshold of this controversy we are again
reminded that courts are created to enforce and not to
make contracts. In other words, unless it is shown that
the contract in question was obtained by fraud, oppression, or duress, or that it is against law or public policy,
13
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or is unconscionable, it is the duty of the courts to
enforce it according to its terms and not by forced construction to modify or disregard it. The terms of the
contract in question here, as we view them, are so
explicit, so plain, and are expressed in such apt and
clear language that there really is nothing for a court
to construe."
When the parties made the contract, they assumed, as all
joint venturers do, that the business would be profitable and
the proceeds would pay expenses, rent, and "dividends". Their
assumption was correct until advent of cinemascope (wide
screen) equipment changed the picture. The plaintiff did not
get its rent because the business did not make it under the new
and unforseen circumstances, and after operating under the
contract very successfully until cinemascope changed the picture,
the plaintiff is now asking the court to find a non-existent
ambiguity, and to make a new contract, which would pay it
some rent. The trial court erred in finding that the contract
imposed a firm obligation on the defendants for payment of
"minimum rent", and the case must be reversed on this point
alone.
2. THE DEFENDANTS DID NOT ARBITRARILY

SET OPERATING COSTS SO HIGH AS TO DEPRIVE
THE PLAINTIFF OF RENT.
Although the complaint does not allege that the expenses
paid pursuant to Article 4 (b) of the contract were excessive,
and the theory of plaintiff has always been that the contract
unposed a firm obligation on the defendants to pay rent, the
court nevertheless took evidence on the nature and amount of

:
:
i

:
',
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expenses paid from the proceeds of operating the theatre since
1946. The details as to the management of the theatre, the
method of contracting for films, the keeping of records to
form the basis for rebates, the salaries of employees and many
other related matters bearing on the expenses are in the
record. Mr. Hal F. Hawk and Grace Hawk explained the
necessity for each business procedure and fully justified all
expenditures ( T r. 40-5 3, 74-101) . Mr. Anderson, secretarytreasurer of the plaintiff, grumbled and complained in court
about some rather small expenditures, but there is not one word
of testimony by anyone that the expenditures were not necessary
or reasonable. The plaintiff did not call an expert in the
theatre business to testify as to the necessity of the expenditures
and did not ask anyone else about it except Grace Hawk and
Hal F. Hawk on cross examination. There is no contradiction
in the record of the positive statements that all expenditures
were necessary, and in fact were modest in amount for the
services rendered.
Furthermore, the contract in express terms gave the Hawks
the right to determine what employees were required. Paragraph 4 (a) provides that out of the proceeds the Hawks
shall, "pay all expenses incurred in connection with the operation of the said theatre business including compensation of a
local manager, cashier, operator and such additional help as
the parties of the second part see fit to employ"!. (Emphasi~l
added.)
The findings of the trial court, Nos. 6 and 8, that the
defendants arbitrarily set costs of operating the theatre too
high, and that they extracted undue and exorbitant operating
15
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expenses are entirely without support in the evidence, and in
fact are contrary to the only evidence on the subject.
3. THE PLAINTIFF IS ESTOPPED FROM QUESTION.
lNG THE EXPENSES OF OPERATING THE THEATRE.
The evidence is that from 1946 to 1955 the plaintiff
received a sum in excess of $26,000.00 under the contract involved in this suit. Weekly or monthly reports of receipts and
expenditures were furnished to the plaintiff from 1946 to
1949. Since 1949 as stated above a copy of every check was
furnished and admittedly received by the plaintiff. The Salt
Lake office expenditures began in 1948 and the testimony is
that they have been substantially the same since that date.
(Tr. 86.)
The acceptance of the checks for its share of the profit
over the years with full knowledge of the facts has estopped
the plaintiff from now claiming that the contract does not
authorize the expenditure of money for such necessaries as
rent, stamps, stationary, bookkeeping, salaries and film booking.
The basic legal principle is well stated in 2 Pomeroy's
Equity Jurisprudence, 4th Ed., Page 1683. as follows:
"Other Instances of Acquiescence.-It is in conform·
ity with the same principle t'hat parties who have long
acquiesced in settlements of accounts or of other mutual
dealings are not permitted to reopen or disturb them;
and this is true, even though the parties stood in con·
fidential relations towards each other, as trustee and
cestui que trust, principal and agent, and the like, and
the settlement embraced matters growing out of such
relations .... " (Emphasis added.)
16
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See also: 31 C.

J.

S. Sec. 109, Page 347.

"Where one having the right to accept or reject a
transaction takes and retains benefits thereunder, he
ratifies the transaction, is bound by it, and cannot avoid
its obligation or effect by taking a position inconsistent
therewith."
31 C.

J.

S. Sec. 110, Page 350.

"As a general rule by accepting benefits a person
may be estopped from questioning the existence, validity and effect of a contract. A party will not be allowed
to assume the inconsistent position of affirming a contract in part by accepting or claiming its benefits, and
disaffirming it in part by repudiating or avoiding its
obligations or burdens." (Emphasis added.)
The rule is stated and applied in the case of Lawson v.
Woodmen of the World, 88 Utah 267, 53 P. 2d 432. In that
case the court said:
"By keeping, pay~ng on and asserting protection
under the contract or policy of 1929, with its rate, they
have by act, word, and conduct ratified the terms
thereof and cannot now be heard, while still holding
their contracts, to assert that the payments made thereunder were not properly collected from them and constitute excess payments or unjust enrichment in the
hands of the association."
The attention of the court is invited to the recent case
of Meads v. Stott, 193 Or. 509, 238 P. 2d. 256, which involved
a venture and controversy similar, in some respects, to the one
before this Court. The following statement of the Court is
pertinent:
"Having operated under this memorandum for approximately five years without objection, accepting its
17
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benefits and obligations both parties must be dee~ed
to have acquiesced in and ratified it as. a t~ue expressto~
of their actual agreement, and by thet~ s~lence when It
was their duty to speak, if not satt~fted, b_oth are
estopped now to take a position inconststent wtth their
conduct.''

,
.
,
:
,

There could be no clearer case for the application of
principles discussed above than that disclosed by the facts in
the instant case. Since 1948 with full knowledge of the facts,
the plaintiff has accepted the benefits of the contract. It has
known that approximately $125.00 per month has been charged
for rent, salaries, stamps, stationery and similar expenses in
the Salt Lake office. The plaintiff has received the fruits
of the contract and now after acquiescing for seven years and
accepting some $26,800.00, the plaintiff seeks to have the
Court declare that there was not intention to permit the charg·
ing of the Salt Lake expenses. In the words of the Oregon
Court, "both parties are estopped now from taking a position
inconsistent with their conduct".
The plaintiff accepted checks representing its share of
the profits until 1955 when the profits were not sufficient to,
cover the expenses. The acceptance of the checks for each year
constituted an account stated between the parties and in accord· :
ance with well settled rules these accounts cannot be reopened
or set aside unless impeached by fraud or mistake.
1

See 48 C. ]. S. Sec. 12 (e) Page 847.
No fraud or mistake has been pleaded, proved, or even
intimated.
The record shows the expenditures during the period in
18
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which no rent was paid and the Court has before it the profit
and loss statement. It does not show any expenditures which
are not ordinarily incident and reasonably necessary to the
operation of a moving picture theatre. In fact the figures
disclose very modest expenses which would not be possible
without handling several t'heatres in the same office so that
salaries for booking films and bookkeeping could be combined.

CONCLUSION
The contract imposes no personal obligation on the
defendants to pay rent, but requires only that rent be paid out
of the proceeds of the theatre business. Since May 1, 1955,
such proceeds have not been sufficient to pay the expenses
of the business, which must, under the provisions of paragraph 4 of the contract, be paid before money is available
for the payment of rent. The plaintiff cannot now question
the items of expense which were paid by the defendants because
it has known in detail about such items since 1949, and with
such knowledge has, for many years, accepted the benefits
of the contract.
It is respectfully submitted that the judgment of the
District Court should be reversed and the complaint dismissed.
J.D. SKEEN
E. J. SKEEN

Attorneys for Appellants
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